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In recent years, landlord-tenant law has moved toward a
greater recognition of tenants' rights to safe and sanitary hous-
ing. One doctrine that has developed to protect tenants' rights,
recognized in most jurisdictions,' is the retaliatory eviction'
defense that prevents landlords from evicting tenants for
attempting to assert their rights. In contrast to the trend, how-
ever, a Washington State Court of Appeals recently denied the
retaliatory eviction defense to periodic tenants, those tenants
most in need of its protection.3 Despite the appellate court's
decision, the policies underlying the Washington State Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Act4 and the Act's language require recog-
1. Most jurisdictions have legislatively recognized the retaliatory eviction defense.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1980); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1942.5 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (West Supp. 1980); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII RED.
STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 562A.36 (West 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.705 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-206, -208.1 (Supp.
1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.5720 (Supp. 1980-81); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 566.03, .28 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 76-1439 (1976): NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.13-a (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-10.10 (West Supp. 1980-81); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8590, 8609 (McKin-
ney 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 321.02 (Page
Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 91-865 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-10 (1970); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 53-5505 (1977); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980). Other jurisdictions have
judicially recognized the defense. E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297
(1970). Cf. Sims v. Century Kiest Apartments, 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(one tenant had a cause of action for damages for termination of periodic tenancy and
eviction in retaliation for reporting housing code violations).
2. "'Retaliatory eviction' is the nomenclature that has developed to define the
action of a landlord who evicts his tenant because of the tenants' reporting of housing
code violations .... It might have been called anything; 'vengeful eviction' or simply,
'getting even'." Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 479, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65-66
(Monroe County Ct. 1972).
3. Tenants for a specified term, unlike periodic tenants, are protected by their lease
and are therefore less likely to be intimidated by the landlord's threat of retaliatory
action. Furthermore, it has been suggested that periodic tenants are more numerous than
other kinds of tenants. Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washing-
ton: Part I, 49 WASH. L. REV. 291, 324 (1974).
4. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 59.18 (1979).
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nition of the retaliatory eviction defense for periodic tenants.
This comment evaluates the availability of the retaliatory
eviction defense to periodic tenants in Washington State in light
of a recent appellate court decision, Stephanus v. Anderson,5
denying periodic tenants the defense where the statutorily
required twenty day termination notice is provided. An analysis
of the basic policies underlying the Act, to ensure safe, sanitary
housing conditions and to prohibit landlords' retaliatory actions
against tenants exercising their rights to attain decent housing
conditions, indicates periodic tenants be allowed to assert the
retaliatory eviction defense. Additionally, the language of the
retaliatory action provision of the statute supports an interpre-
tation granting periodic tenants use of the defense. Based on
these considerations, this comment concludes that Washington
State courts should recognize the availability of the retaliatory
eviction defense to periodic tenants.
The common law warranty of habitability and housing
codes formed the basis for the development of the retaliatory
eviction defense. Historically at common law, when a tenant
leased land from a landlord, property law governed the transac-
tion; the lease was considered a conveyance of an interest in
land.7 The tenant acquired an estate in land and was subject to
the doctrine of caveat emptor, which placed the burden of
inspecting the premises on the tenant and left him without
redress for defective housing conditions.8 In light of economic
and social conditions of that time, placement of the burden on
the tenant made sense. In an agrarian economy, the land itself
was valuable and the tenant worked on the land to make money
for rent.9 Generally, both landlord and tenant had knowledge of
the land's condition 0 and the tenant had the skills to make
5. 26 Wash. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1014 (1980).
6. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969).
7. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 26, 515 P.2d 160, 163 (1973).
8. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969); Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 594-95, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961).
9. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 430, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (1969);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971).
10. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 & n.32 (D.C. Cir.), cert.




needed repairs,11 particularly because buildings were constructed
simply.1 2 At that time leases were not standardized forms, but
probably manifested the actual expectations of the parties."
The conditions that justified the early landlord-tenant law,
however, no longer exist. Today leases are used primarily in
urban settings."' Few tenants obtain rent by working the land;
they do not lease land. Rather they bargain for living space,"
usually in multi-unit apartment complexes." Typically, the
landlord has more knowledge of the premise's condition than the
tenant; any violations of housing or building codes are reported
to the landlord.1 7 Today's city dweller is unlikely to possess the
requisite skills or financial resources to make repairs in modern
apartment buildings.18 Moreover repairs in multiple unit build-
ings frequently require access to areas in control of other
tenants or the landlord.19 Finally, tight housing markets, com-
mon in urban areas, leave the tenant with little bargaining lever-
age;20 he needs a home and has few choices. Standardized form
leases predominate, rendering unequal the bargaining positions
of landlord and tenant.2' Yet, as cities grew the courts continued
to apply the common law caveat emptor notion that developed
11. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 & nn.32 & 33 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517
P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d
248, 250-51 (1971).
12. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 430, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (1969).
13. Id. at 430, 462 P.2d at 472-73.
14. During the past century and a half new social factors have exerted increas-
ing influence on the law of estates for years. The growth of cities and the
employment of leases for urban properties have shifted the background of this
field of law [landlord-tenant law] from one predominantly agrarian to one
predominantly urban.
2 R. PowE.LL, RE.AL PROPERTY 221[1], at 180 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 430, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (1969); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 27, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
16. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 432-33, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969).
18. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
20. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 2 R.
POWELL, supra note 14, at 185.
21. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709
(1974).
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in an agrarian culture.2 2 More recently, legislative bodies and
courts realized that the economic and social conditions forming
the basis of the early common law no longer applied in an urban
setting and that application of those principles caused substan-
dard housing conditions.2 3 This recognition led to the develop-
ment of housing codes 24 and the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, 5 designed to secure safe and sanitary housing conditions.
Housing codes and warranties of habitability were of little value,
however, if landlords could retaliate against tenants by evicting
them for complaining of housing violations.
The retaliatory eviction defense developed to ensure that
the decisions of modern legislative bodies and courts to promote
habitable rental housing conditions, through housing codes and
implied warranties of habitability, were not rendered meaning-
less by landlord intimidation. 6 Traditional property law allowed
22. See, e.g., Graham v. Wisenburn, 39 A.D.2d 334, 334 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1972); Smith v.
M.P.W. Realty Co., 423 Pa. 536, 225 A.2d 227 (1967); Bidlake v. Youell, Inc., 51 Wash.
2d 59, 315 P.2d 644 (1957).
23. Safe and sanitary housing conditions are recognized as desirable for numerous
reasons. The Washington State Supreme Court, in recognizing the implied warranty of
habitability, noted that deteriorated housing is a contributing cause of juvenile delin-
quency, urban blight, and high property taxes for conscientious landowners. Foisy v.
Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164-65 (1973). Blighted housing has also been
cited as "dangerous to the safety, morals, and general welfare of the people; that condi-
tions existing on such blighted premises necessitate excessive and disproportionate
expenditure or [sic] public funds for public safety, crime prevention, fire protection, and
other public services;" Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 396, 173 N.W.2d 297, 300
(1970). Furthermore, studies suggest the "type of housing occupied influences health,
behavior and attitude, particularly if the housing is desperately inadequate." Schorr,
Slums and Social Insecurity, in HOUSING IN AMERICAN: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 13
(R. Montgomery & D. Mandelker 1979). See note 48 infra.
24. The earliest housing codes in the United States were developed before the
American Revolution. The New York law, for example, "tried to prevent people from
keeping hay, straw, pitch, tar, and turpentine where the danger of fire was great." L.
FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 25 (1968). A century later the New York
tenement law required certain classifications of rental housing be equipped with ventila-
tors, fire escapes, garbage receptacles, and adequate chimneys. Id. at 27. Although a
number of other jurisdictions subsequently passed housing codes, the movement toward
housing codes was not substantial until after World War II. At that time, federal legisla-
tion specified housing codes as a prerequisite for federal slum clearance and redevelop-
ment aid to municipalities. "Up to 1955, only 56 communities had housing codes. By
July 1961, the number had increased to 493, and by July 1963 to 736." Id. at 50.
25. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1974); Foisy v.
Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961). The warranty of habitability implies a promise by the landlord that
rental premises are in a safe, livable condition at the start of the lease.
26. A number of courts have articulated the argument. For example: "To permit
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a landlord to evict a periodic tenant if proper notice was given
regardless of motivation.2 7 Eviction at will under common law,
where the tenant presumably had the ability to make repairs
himself and no legal right to habitable housing, did not foster
unsafe and unsanitary housing. But once the legal right to habit-
able housing was established, tenants, to obtain safe and sani-
tary housing conditions, needed protection from eviction for
reporting housing law violations. The retaliatory eviction
defense prevents a tenant's eviction for exercising his rights,
thus providing the necessary protection. The defense is needed
to effectuate the policy promoting habitable housing underlying
the housing codes and warranty of habitability.
The Washington legislature, recognizing that the basic prin-
ciples of an agrarian society no longer applied s to contemporary
landlord-tenant relationships, adopted a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme,"9 the Washington State Residential Landlord-Ten-
ant Act, to secure habitable rental housing. To make those pro-
visions designed to secure habitable housing meaningful, the
legislature recognized the necessity of preventing retaliatory
action by landlords. The 1973 Act contains provisions expressly
recognizing "the public policy of this state in favor of the ensur-
ing safe, and sanitary housing' 'ao and that are designed to assure
habitable rental premises.8 Although the Act excludes some
retaliatory eviction. . . would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code as a
means of upgrading the quality of housing. . . ." Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700-
01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). "If a landlord could terminate a
tenancy solely because his tenant had reported a violation the intention of the legislature
would be frustrated." Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 397, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301
(1970).
27. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969); Sims v. Century Kiest Apartments, 567 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978).
28. Two years before the Landlord-Tenant Act passed, the Washington Supreme
Court noted that in the decade of the 1960's alone, Washington had an increase of more
than 77,000 rental units, affecting hundreds of thousands of people. McCutcheon v.
United Home Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 449, 486 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1971).
29. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.010-.900 (1979). For a review of some of the difficul-
ties encountered in passing the Landlord-Tenant Act, see Blumberg, Analysis of
Recently Enacted Arizona and Washington State Landlord Tenant Bills, 7 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 134 (1973).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.360(3) (1979).
31. The statute provides in pertinent part:
The landlord will at all times during the tenancy keep the premises fit for
human habitation, and shall in particular;
(1) Maintain the premises to substantially comply with any applicable
code, statute, ordinance, or regulation governing their maintenance or opera-
420 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 4:415
classifications of tenants from coverage, it protects periodic
tenants.-2 The Act gives tenants major responsibility for notify-
ing authorities and landlords of conditions violating the statu-
tory provisions.3 3 To protect tenants who assert their statutory
rights in order to aid the state's" enforcement of the policy of
providing safe and sanitary housing conditions, the Act also pro-
hibits landlords from taking retaliatory action against tenants."
Recently, a Washington Court of Appeals evaluated the
retaliatory eviction defense's availability to periodic tenants. In
tion, which the legislative body. . . could enforce as to the premises rented if
such condition substantially endangers or impairs the health or safety of the
tenant;
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.060 (1979)(also lists specific landlord duties to keep premises
safe and sanitary).
32. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.040 (1979). The section exempts certain living
arrangements and classifications of tenants from coverage, for example, residence inci-
dental to detention and rentals to seasonal agricultural workers, but does not mention
periodic tenants.
33. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.070 (1979). The relevant part of the statute
provides:
If at any time during the tenancy the landlord fails to carry out the duties
required by RCW 59.18.060, the tenant may, in addition to pursuit of remedies
otherwise provided him by law, deliver written notice to the person designated
in subsection (11) of RCW 59.18.060 [the landlord] or to the person who col-
lects the rent, which notice shall specify the premises involved, the name of the
owner, if known, and the nature of the defective condition.
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.070 (1979). Other jurisdictions have noted the tenants' role in
enforcing housing laws. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 483, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 69-70 (1972).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (1979):
So long as the tenant is in compliance with this chapter the landlord shall not
take or threaten to take reprisals or retaliatory action against the tenant
because of any good faith and lawful:
(1) Complaints or reports by the tenant to a governmental authority concern-
ing the failure of the landlord to substantially comply with any code, statute,
ordinance or regulation governing the maintenance or operation of the prem-
ises, if such condition may endanger or impair the health or safety of the
tenant;
(2) Assertions or enforcement by the tenant of his rights and remedies under
this chapter.
"Reprisal or retaliatory action" shall mean and include but not be limited to
any of the following actions by the landlord when such actions are intended
primarily to retaliate against a tenant because of the tenants' good faith and
lawful act:
(1) Eviction of the tenant other than giving a notice to terminate tenancy as
provided in RCW 59.18.200;
(2) Increasing the rent required of the tenant;
(3) Reduction of services to the tenant;
(4) Increasing the obligations of the tenant.
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Stephanus v. Anderson"5 periodic tenants sought to assert a
retaliatory eviction defense under the Landlord-Tenant Act
when their tenancies were terminated. Two month-to-month
tenants in a large Seattle apartment building received notice, in
late 1978, of a rent increase." Informed by the State Attorney
General's Office that the notice of the rent increase may have
been inadequate, the two tenants organized a tenants' meeting."7
Subsequently, the landlord gave the tenants the statutory
twenty days termination notice in accordance with section
59.18.200 of the Act.38 The tenants refused to leave and the
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action. 9 The tenants
asserted as an affirmative defense that the eviction was retalia-
tory under Wash. Rev. Code section 59.18.240, the retaliatory
action section of the Landlord-Tenant Act. The trial court, how-
ever, struck the defense. 0 The court of appeals affirmed, con-
cluding that "the plain words of RCW 59.18.240 state that a ten-
ancy terminated pursuant to RCW 59.18.200" is not subject to
the prohibition against retaliatory eviction.' ' 2 The Stephanus
35. 26 Wash. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1014 (1980).
36. See Brief of Appellants at 4, Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 613
P.2d 533 (1980).
37. See id.
38. 26 Wash. App. at 328, 613 P.2d at 535.
39. The statutory definition of unlawful detainer provides in relevant part:
A tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of unlawful detainer
either:
(2) when he, having leased property for an indefinite time with monthly or
other periodic rent reserved, continues in possession thereof, in person or by
subtenant, after the end of any such month or period, when the landlord more
than twenty days prior to the end of such month or period, has served notice
. . . requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of such month or
period ....
WASH. REv. CoDE § 59.12.030 (1979).
40. 26 Wash. App. at 328, 613 P.2d at 535.
41. When premises are rented for an indefinite time, with monthly or other
periodic rent reserved, such tenancy shall be construed to be a tenancy from
month to month, or from period to period on which rent is payable, and shall
be terminated by written notice of twenty days or more, preceding the end of
any said months or periods, given by either party to the other.
WASH. REv. CoDE § 59.18.200(1) (1979).
42. 26 Wash. App. at 329, 613 P.2d at 536 (footnote added). Although the scope of
this comment is limited to the question of whether the Landlord-Tenant Act grants peri-
odic tenants the retaliatory eviction defense, the tenants presented two other primary
arguments on appeal in Stephanus. First, they asserted retaliatory eviction as an equita-
ble defense. Id. at 331, 613 P.2d at 537. The court noted that an equitable defense must
be based upon a substantive legal right. The court concluded that section 59.18.240
(2)(1), which the court interpreted as denying periodic tenants the retaliatory eviction
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decision indicates that, regardless of the motivation for termina-
tion, if the landlord provides proper notice, a periodic tenant
cannot use the retaliatory eviction defense. Assuming landlords
will give proper statutory notice, Stephanus in essence elimi-
nates the retaliatory eviction defense for periodic tenants
regardless of the landlord's motive for termination. Thus, even if
a tenant exercises his rights under the Act to complain of unsafe
housing conditions his tenancy can be terminated, thus necessi-
tating a change of residence.
The Stephanus court's interpretation of the retaliatory
action section, denying periodic tenants the retaliatory eviction
defense, thus deters periodic tenants from exercising their statu-
tory rights. Changing living quarters entails significant costs
including moving expenses, utility deposits, connection charges,
and rental security deposits. Surely, in some cases, these costs
would be prohibitive. The Landlord-Tenant Act gives landlords
fourteen days after vacation of the premises to return rental
deposits.4" Yet, rental security deposits are required before mov-
ing into a new rental unit. A tenant needs a substantial cash
supply to change living quarters. In addition, moving involves
time and, perhaps, changes in personal relationships. The com-
bined burdens of these economic and social costs constitute a
sufficient reason for tenants wishing to remain in the same
dwelling. Because moving involves a substantial burden, periodic
tenants, without protection against retaliatory eviction by land-
lords, are deterred from asserting the rights granted by the Act.
The deterrent effect of denying periodic tenants the retalia-
tory eviction defense is greatest where tenants' housing options
are severely restricted. Tenants will not risk eviction for assert-
ing their rights if they will be unable to find another residence.
During the past few years, and in particular during the time
defense when the requisite notice is provided, controlled over the general provision that
would have provided the substantive right in the state and city codes. Id. at 332, 613
P.2d at 537. Second, the tenants contended the eviction's enforcement through the
courts constituted sufficient state actions against them for exercising their first amend-
ment rights, and, consequently, was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 334, 613 P.2d at 538. The court failed to find the necessary state action. Id. at 335,
613 P.2d at 539.
43. WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.280 (1979) provides in relevant part:
Within fourteen days after the termination of the rental agreement and vaca-
tion of the premises the landlord shall give a full and specific statement of the
basis for retaining any of the deposit together with the payment of any refund
due the tenant under the terms and conditions of the rental agreement.
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Stephanus was litigated, the rental housing market in the Seat-
tle area was extremely tight" - some areas had a reported
vacancy rate of zero."5 Periodic tenants in a tight housing mar-
ket, with few, if any, alternative housing units available, are
greatly deterred from exerting their rights under the Act absent
protection from retaliatory eviction.
Because periodic tenants are deterred from asserting their
right to habitable housing without protection against retaliatory
eviction, the Stephanus decision, denying periodic tenants the
retaliatory eviction defense, directly conflicts with the Act's pro-
visions designed to implement public policies the Act recognizes.
By denying the retaliatory eviction defense, the court renders
meaningless the provisions aimed at securing habitable housing
conditions for periodic tenants. A tenant who fears eviction is
unlikely to assert his statutory right to protest unsafe or unsani-
tary housing conditions if he can be evicted for that assertion.
Similarly, denying periodic tenants the retaliatory eviction
defense emasculates other remedies expressly provided by the
Act. Under the Act, a tenant may contract out repairs of defec-
tive housing conditions and deduct up to one month's rent or
repair defects himself and deduct up to one-half month's rent."
But periodic tenants are not likely to use the repair and deduct
provisions if landlords can evict for their use. The result is that
periodic tenants are deterred, and effectively prevented, from
exercising the rights the legislature deemed necessary to achieve
the Act's objective. This deterrent effect undermines enforce-
ment of the provisions designed to ensure habitable housing.
Moreover, denying periodic tenants the defense, thereby deter-
ring complaints, conflicts with the recognized public policy of
encouraging reports of law violators to authorities.47 Denying
periodic tenants the retaliatory eviction defense, therefore, sub-
44. The multiple family unit vacancy rate in the Seattle area hovered near two per-
cent from October, 1978 to April, 1980. SEATTLE REAL ESTATE RESEARCH COMMrrEE, 31
SEATTLE REAL ESTATE RESEARCH REPORT 14, 15 (Spring 1980). The rate may have moder-
ated recently. An August 1980 survey found a vacancy rate in Seattle of over four per-
cent. The Seattle Times, Aug. 24, 1980, § E, at 9, col. 1. It has been suggested, however,
that the demand for rental housing will rise: by 1990 only a projected eight percent of all
Washington households will be able to afford a median-priced single family house.
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPmENT, HOUSING REPORT 5 (1978).
45. SEATTLE REAL ESTATE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 14.
46. WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.100(2)-(3) (1979).
47. See, e.g., Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th
Cir. 1972); Sims v. Century Kiest Apartments, 567 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 260, 268, 67 P.2d 868, 872 (1937).
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stantially precludes effective enforcement of the Act's provision
designed to ensure habitable housing, resulting in property dete-
rioration and substandard rental housing conditions.48 There-
fore, an interpretation of the retaliatory action provision that
denies the retaliatory eviction defense directly conflicts with the
provisions of the Act intended to effectuate the Act's recognized
policies.
Although no other jurisdiction has a retaliatory action pro-
vision worded similarly to Washington's, seemingly excluding
from the definition of retaliatory action any procedurally proper
termination of a periodic tenancy, other jurisdictions have dealt
with conflicting landlord-tenant laws, resolving conflicts in favor
of the policy promoting safe and sanitary housing conditions.
The California Supreme Court in Schweiger v. Superior Court,
confronted with inconsistent statutory provisions, held that
tenants had a right to protection from landlord retaliation. In
Schweiger, two California statutory sections were in conflict: one
section gave tenants the right to demand that the landlord
repair the premises and, if the landlord refused, to do the
repairs themselves, deducting the cost from the rent;'* another
implied that the landlord had the power to raise the rent to any
level and evict if the tenant failed to pay.51 When the periodic
48. For a debate considering whether housing law enforcement in fact results in
improved housing, see Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093 (1971); Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply
to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Cri-
tique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE
L.J. 1175 (1973). See note 23 supra.
49. 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
50. If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which
he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself,
where the cost of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater than one
month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the
rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be dis-
charged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1954)(current version at CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp.
1981)), quoted in Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 510 n.1, 476 P.2d 97, 98 n.1,
90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 730 n.1 (1970).
51. A tenant of real property, for a term less than life .... is guilty of unlawful
detainer: . . . When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant,
without the permission of his landlord .... after default in the payment of
rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and
three days' notice, in writing, requiring its payment, stating the amount which
is due, or possession of the property shall have been served upon him and if
there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such
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tenant in Schweiger requested repairs, the landlord raised his
rent substantially. The tenant repaired his apartment and
deducted the cost from his pre-increase rental payment. When
the landlord commenced an unlawful detainer action, the tenant
asserted a retaliatory eviction defense. The California Supreme
Court identified the issue as one of "statutory construction
necessitating the resolution of an apparent conflict between Cal-
ifornia Code sections affecting the rights of landlords and
tenants." 2 The California Supreme Court decided that the stat-
utory policy granting tenants the right to habitable premises was
dominant over the landlord's right to raise his rent and evict for
any reason" and, therefore, tenants had a right to assert a retal-
iatory eviction defense.
If the Washington Act is interpreted as presenting a conflict
of statutory provisions, then the Schweiger court's solution
could be used to allow periodic tenants a retaliatory eviction
defense. The Stephanus court concluded that the subsection of
the retaliatory action section of the Act, expressly excluding
periodic tenants from using the defense where proper notice is
provided," may conflict with the sections requiring that prem-
ises be maintained in habitable conditions8 and specifying that
tenants may report violations. 6 The Washington Supreme Court
recognized its duty to interpret statutes in light of the statute's
purpose. 7 Thus, the decision in Schweiger, giving effect to the
statutory policy, is persuasive in Washington. Washington's stat-
utory policy to encourage decent housing must be given effect -
that policy outweighs the landlord's desire to evict at will. Thus,
assuming that the statute expressly excluded periodic tenants
from asserting the retaliatory eviction defense, that provision is
subordinate to the policy of ensuring habitable housing, a policy
effectuated by the retaliatory eviction defense.
subtenant.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1161(2) (West Supp. 1981), quoted in Schweiger v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 511 n.2, 476 P.2d 97, 99 n.2, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 n.2 (1970).
52. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d at 511, 476 P.2d at 99, 90 Cal. Rptr. at
731.
53. See id. at 516, 476 P.2d at 102, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
54. See WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.240(2) (1979).
55. See WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.060 (1979).
56. See WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.070 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Board of Medical Examiners, 93
Wash. 2d 117, 120, 605 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1980); Janovich v. Herron, 91 Wash. 2d 767, 771,
592 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 (1979); Washington Water Power Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n,
91 Wash. 2d 62, 66, 586 P.2d 1149, 1152 (1978).
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Yet, the statute can be read as not expressly precluding
periodic tenants from asserting the retaliatory eviction defense,
thus avoiding the difficulties of resolving a conflict of statutory
sections. The relevant sections of the Landlord-Tenant Act
provide:
"Reprisal or retaliatory action" shall mean and include but not
be limited to any of the following actions by the landlord when
such actions are intended primarily to retaliate against a ten-
ant because of the tenant's good faith and lawful act:
(1) Eviction of the tenant other than giving a notice to termi-
nate tenancy as provided in RCW 59.18.200;
(2) Increasing the rent required of the tenant;
(3) Reduction of services to the tenant;
(4) Increasing the obligations of the tenant.
. . . Initiation by the landlord of any action listed in RCW
59.18.240 within ninety days after a good faith and lawful act
by the tenant as enumerated in RCW 59.18.240... shall cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption . . . that the action is a reprisal
or retaliatory action against the tenant."
The Stephanus court focused on the exclusion for proper notice
under section 59.18.200 and concluded the "plain words"
excluded the retaliatory eviction defense where the landlord met
the notice requirement.5 9 The retaliatory action definition, how-
ever, when considered as a whole, literally allows periodic
tenants the defense even if proper statutory eviction notice is
provided.60 The definition lists four specific examples of actions
presumed retaliatory.61 But the definition also expressly pro-
vides that the listed actions are not exclusive; they are only
examples.62 Logically, although not presumptively, other actions
58. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.240-.250 (1979) (emphasis added). For the complete
text of section 59.18.240, see note 34 supra.
59. 26 Wash. App. at 329, 613 P.2d at 536.
60. See Clarke, Washington's Implied Warranty of Habitability: Reform or Illu-
sion, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 58 n.334 (1978). But see Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns
v. Evans, 88 Wash. 2d 563, 570, 564 P.2d 788, 793 (1977). (The Evans court, however,
focussed on the validity of the Governor's veto of numerous sections of the Landlord-
Tenant Act, not on whether the retaliatory eviction defense was available to periodic
tenants); B. ISENHOUR, J. FEARN & S. FREDERICKSON, TENANT'S RIGHTS 74 (1977); Clarke,
supra at 57 n.332.
61. The actions listed in section 59.18.240 are in certain circumstances presumed
retaliatory under section 59.18.250. Landlord conduct not listed must be proven as
intended in retaliation.
62. See 26 Wash. App. at 329, 613 P.2d at 536.
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besides those listed may be considered retaliatory.63 The lan-
guage excluding termination with proper notice from the first
example of retaliatory action serves two functions: (1) to pre-
cisely define a retaliatory action example, and (2) to remove ter-
minations with proper notice from the category of actions pre-
sumed retaliatory. Where a landlord provides proper notice
terminating a tenancy, the action is not presumed retaliatory.
But, because other actions besides those listed as examples can
be retaliatory, the tenant must have an opportunity to show that
the landlord's action was intended to retaliate. The language of
the retaliatory action section of the Act grants periodic tenants
the retaliatory action defense.
Because the Act's language and underlying policy of encour-
aging decent housing suggest that periodic tenants be allowed to
assert the retaliatory eviction defense, a court, to deny the
defense, must base its decision on other grounds. A court could
reason either that the legislature intended to exclude periodic
tenants from the defense when notice is given" or that other
interests outweigh the interest protected by allowing the
defense. A full examination of the Washington statute fails to
support such reasoning.
There are no indications6 that the legislature intended to
deny periodic tenants the Act's protection by making the retali-
atory eviction defense unavailable to them. First, the legislative
history'7 of the Act is inconclusive because the retaliatory action
definition as it now reads resulted from separate amendments in
both legislative houses. 8 Therefore, it is impossible to determine
63. Other jurisdictions have developed tests to prove retaliatory intent. See, e.g.,
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (1970).
64. See 26 Wash. App. at 330-31, 613 P.2d at 536.
65. See S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1976).
66. In order to interpret statutes, it is necessary to consider all relevant evidence.
See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rv.
527, 541 (1947).
67. There are a number of criticisms of the use of legislative history in construing
statutes. It is, of course, highly improbable that hundreds of legislators ever have the
same intention. Recorded statements of a small percentage of that body do not necessa-
rily reflect the views of others. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L.
REv. 863, 870 (1930). In addition, there is a potential for abuse. Legislators may "manu-
facture" legislative history for use by the courts. See, e.g., Coffman, Essay on Statutory
Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST. L. Rav. 57, 76-77 (1978).
68. When the bill left the Senate Judiciary Committee, the retaliatory action defini-
tion did not include either the provision expressly excluding eviction where proper notice
is provided, or the language expanding the definition beyond the listed examples of retal-
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intent from the legislative history. Second, the language of the
statute, when read as a whole, mandates that conduct by land-
lords may presumptively be retaliatory and, with proof of intent,
conduct besides the examples cited may constitute retaliatory
action against periodic tenants. Third, the history and develop-
ment of the policy promoting habitable conditions, underlying
the Act, emphasize the importance of preventing retaliatory
eviction. There are no indications that the legislature intended
to deny periodic tenants the retaliatory eviction defense.
In addition, an assertion that other interests outweigh the
policy behind the retaliatory eviction defense lacks support. Two
basic policies have been recognized as colliding with the retalia-
tory eviction defense: (1) the protection of private property
rights69 and (2) the need to have speedy unlawful detainer pro-
ceedings.7 0 That the legislature considered these interests as
subordinate to the policies of insuring safe and sanitary housing
conditions and of protecting people who report law violations is
manifested by the Act. The Act unambiguously allows other
retaliatory action defenses. For example, non-periodic tenants
are protected from retaliatory eviction and all tenants covered
by the Act are protected from retaliatory rent increases. It fol-
lows that private property interests and the interest for a speedy
unlawful detainer procedure are acknowledged by the legislature
as subordinate to the need to protect tenants' statutory rights.
Thus, an assertion that other policies outweigh the policy sup-
porting the retaliatory eviction defense is refuted by the statu-
tory provisions.
Viewing the retaliatory action definition in light of its lan-
guage and the policies underlying the entire Act supports an
interpretation that allows periodic tenants the retaliatory evic-
tion defense if the landlord's motive is improper, even when the
requisite termination notice is given. Protection of the right to
iatory action. The Senate amended the bill to include the provision excluding eviction of
tenants with notice from the examples of retaliatory action. See 1973 Wash. Senate J.
1005. The House, two weeks later, amended the bill to include the provision expanding
the definition beyond the listed examples. See id. at 1364. Note the 1980 House passed a
bill deleting the exclusionary language from the listed examples of retaliatory action.
The bill failed to reach the Senate floor. Legislative Digest and History of Bills of the
Senate and House of Representatives, 46th Session, 991 (1980).
69. Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, 419-20, 508 P.2d 1217, 1219-20 (1973).
70. See, e.g., S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 723-24, 552 P.2d 721,
723, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 763 (1976); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 515-16,
476 P.2d 97, 101, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1970).
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live in safe and habitable surroundings, and to voice complaints
regarding living conditions is essential to the effectuation of the
Act. The Stephanus decision effectively denies periodic tenants
the right to complain of housing law violations and, hence, the
right to habitable premises, severely frustrating the policy of
promoting habitable housing. Despite the Stephanus court's
interpretation, periodic tenants, covered under the Act, are
entitled to the protection provided by the retaliatory eviction
defense. The policies supporting the defense are applicable with
equal force to periodic tenants. Furthermore, the language of the
statute's definition of retaliatory action allows periodic tenants
the retaliatory action defense even where the landlord gives
proper notice. Recognizing periodic tenants' right to assert the
retaliatory eviction defense has strong support and is essential
for protecting the rights granted by the Landlord-Tenant Act.
Phillip Raymond
